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The fallout of the financial and euro zone crises have brought to the fore much of the insight offered by the 
respective analytical traditions of comparative and international political economy, particularly when 
compared to the spectacular failure of the intellectual paradigms in which academic economics remains 
trapped.  The crises have shown the importance of both the relationships within nation-states between 
contested domestic politics and institutional economic environments and the cross-national consequences 
of vast international financial markets and economic interdependence.  There is also, however, a tension 
between understanding the crises through analytical approaches that emphasise national economic and 
political differentiation and those that give primacy to the commonality of the external economic and 
political environment. If, for example, as some argue, the financial crisis has its origins in the particulars 
of an overly financialised American economy then the international fallout of the crisis primarily arose 
from contagion; by contrast, if the crisis was more the product of the global financial structure during the 
pre-crisis years, then national differences at best explain the extent to which individual economies suffered 
and the contingencies of states’ responses.  
In many ways comparative arguments have dominated political economy approaches to both crises. 
Many political economy scholars have portrayed the financial crisis as Anglo-American origin and argued 
that those economies that shared Anglo-American characteristics around finance were hit hardest and 
most directly (Bell and Hindmoor 2015; Hay 2o11, 2013; Hall 2013; Gamble 2014).  Certainly there are 
important differences between comparative approaches that stress institutional features of national 
capitalism and those emphasising the political contingencies of growth models (Hay and Smith 2013). 
Nonetheless these comparative arguments generally uphold a sharp distinction between the weakness of 
the Anglo-American style economies and the strength of the German with the French in the middle of the 
dichotomy.  The conclusions drawn from this comparative differentiation have echoed the dominant 
political narratives in France and Germany since 2008 that have cast blame upon Wall Street and what 
President Sarkozy repeatedly called the ‘Anglo-Saxon model’ of capitalism (Reuters, 2 April 2009). 
Meanwhile, a number of comparative scholars have analysed the euro zone crisis through the 
varieties of capitalism lens (Hall 2014; Hancké 2013; Johnston, Hancké and Pant 2014).  Peter Hall (2014, 
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1226) for his part has argued that the euro zone ‘crisis has taken a form shaped by national varieties of 
capitalism’. These comparative arguments have focused attention on the institutional differences between 
the economies of the northern and southern euro zone member states. This approach to the political 
geography of the euro zone crisis has again had a political parallel in the rhetorical desire of the German 
government to blame the crisis on an absence of structural reform in the periphery and the counter 
response from some periphery governments that the essential problem of the euro zone is the German 
obsession with procuring a trade surplus.  
There is, however, a paradox at work in most comparative political economy approaches to the two 
crises. These crises have both at their epicentre been banking crises. Whilst a great deal of political effort 
has gone into denying this reality in the case of the euro zone, the denial, as Mark Blyth (2013) has 
forcefully argued, does not make it any less true. Yet with some noticeable exceptions  (Hardie and 
Howarth 2013; Bell and Hindmoor 2015) much comparative political economy analysis has eschewed 
specific analysis of banks during the financial crisis for macro-level accounts of national institutional and 
political variation (Hardie et al 2013b, 2).  Moreover, when banks are put at the centre of the crisis some of 
the general comparative arguments about specific national dissimilarity falter. In particular the 
conventional comparative political economy dichotomy generated within the varieties of capitalism 
literature between the US and the UK as a pair and Germany on the other side with France in a middle 
position has limited utility in this instance.  Rather than US and UK banks showing common weaknesses 
during the financial crisis, there were significant differences between the experiences of UK and US 
commercial and universal banks, not least in the crucial matter of dependency on wholesale markets for 
funding lending (Hardie and Maxfield 2013).  Indeed, as this paper will argue, the experiences of UK 
banks between 2007 and 2009 were more similar to those of German and French banks than they were to 
US banks. UK, German and French large commercial and universal banks confronted problems during the 
financial crisis of a different order of magnitude than those faced by their American counterparts. 
Moreover, these problems arose in significant part because of a distinctive funding issue around access to 
dollars as a foreign currency that by definition US banks could not have confronted. For the afflicted 
German and French banks, this dollar problem then continued into the euro zone crisis. Once we 
recognise the importance of this issue of dollar access for these European banks, analytically pairing any 
other economies’ banks with those of the US is misleading. 
 3 
The most penetrating comparative political economy explanations of the financial crisis as a 
banking crisis are those, like Hardie et al (2013a) and Hardie and Howarth (2013a), that have started from 
the specifics of the large-scale international changes in banking since the late 1990s. As these scholars 
have demonstrated, international market-based banking took hold in the pre-crisis years across advanced 
economies with the singular exception of Japan regardless of the national form of capitalism. Crucially, 
this internationalised form of banking established new external constraints for banks in their lending and 
borrowing. This change also occurred in the context in which the consequences of financialisation have 
transformed systemic risk in international financial markets (Dore 2008; Epstein 2005).  In Andrew 
Baker’s (2013, 116) words, ‘relatively small unexpected events can generate increasingly costly explosions 
that no model of political economy can sustain’. Financialised economies are less predictable and more 
dangerous than their predecessors (Taleb and Blyth 2011), and, as a consequence, contingent, national 
institutional structures have become less important than they were in explaining the occurrence or 
absence of crises. 
In this context, the privileging of the external environment within international political economy 
scholarship in principle has clear analytical advantages. Yet as Cohen (2009) has noted few international 
political economy scholars prior to the crisis in practice concentrated their attention on the systemic 
destabilising dynamics generated by financialisation and internationalised market-based banking. Neither 
since the crisis has much attention been paid in international political economy arguments to the issue of 
the dependency of non-US banks on dollar funding.  This is in many ways odd since the 
internationalisation of banking was part of a significant structural change to the capital side of the 
international economy during the pre-crisis years and its fallout since the crisis in terms of power relations 
between states has been politically charged. In part as a result of the internationalisation of banking, the 
volume of gross international capital flows nearly trebled between 2002 and 2007 (Lane 2013, 7).  
Although the large global imbalances in current accounts between the US and East Asia also played its part 
in this rise, and indeed was the focus of political economy scholars (Thompson 2010; Obstfeld and Rogoff 
2009) who did stress the destabilising role of capital flows in the financial crisis, more of the pre-crisis rise 
in international capital flows was the product of cross-border bank flows (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008; 
Milesi-Ferretti, Strobbe, and Tamirisa 2010).  At the centre of these flows stood the large commercial and 
universal banks of a number of European economies (Bank of International Settlements (BIS) Committee 
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on the Global Financial System 2010, 1) More specifically, the European banks drove a huge volume of 
capital movements within the euro zone, particularly from the core to the periphery (Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti 2008).  Indeed gross capital flows at their peak between 2002 and 2007 were far higher within 
euro zone economies than in any other advanced economy (Lane 2013, 17).  These European banks were 
also the major foreign purchasers of US-issued asset-backed securities and they borrowed heavily in 
American money markets to fund these purchases (Lane 2012; Noeth and Sengupta 2012, 463).  In this 
context the financial crisis and the euro zone crisis can in some crucial respects be understood as crises of 
capital flows. Between 2007 and 2012 both French, German, and UK banks on the one hand and the 
periphery economies on the other suffered acute crises generated by the catastrophic interruption of lines 
of short-term capital that had flowed steadily during the pre-crisis years. In manifestation the initial crises 
were different. The French, German and UK banks needed dollar funding and the periphery needed access 
to credit in a currency it shared with its creditors. But both sets of actors were constrained by market 
dynamics around international capital flows.  Just as significantly, however, the resolution of these crises 
through these actors’ respective access to emergency credit from non-national official institutions revealed 
much about the power dynamics at work in the present international economy.  
Taking the rise of international market-based banking and its accompanying risks as a starting 
place, this paper analyses the financial crisis and the euro zone crisis as experienced by French, German 
and UK banks and the periphery states of the euro zone as parallel crises around structural external 
constraints in relation to capital flows and access to emergency credit. Whilst it reiterates some of the 
conclusions of Blyth (2013) and Hardie at al (2013a; 2013b), its analytical focus is on international capital 
flows and the power relations generated by access to emergency credit as separate structural external 
constraints. Empirically, it shows how at different crisis junctures a number of French, German and UK 
banks required external rescue by the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and how a capital flows crisis in the 
periphery that led to a significant loss of national autonomy for the periphery in relation to the ECB was 
matched by an external funding crisis for French and German banks that was in autonomy terms much 
less consequential. Theoretically, it asserts the ongoing importance of the external pathologies around 
both international capital flows and structural power dynamics around the access to emergency credit that 
have characterised the international economy since the beginnings of financial liberalisation.  
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The remainder of the paper is divided into four parts. The first part considers the 
internationalisation of bank assets. It demonstrates the similarities between French, German and UK 
banks in contrast to American banks in the risks international assets generated, and shows how French 
and German banks ran symmetrical risks with their holdings of US asset-backed securities and euro zone 
periphery bonds. The second section examines the internationalisation of bank funding and explains how 
the shared dependency of French, German and UK banks on dollar wholesale markets made them 
endogenously vulnerable to crisis and reliant when crisis came on American financial support. It also 
explains how for French and German banks the financial and euro zone crises were both funding crises. 
The third section shows how the sharp rise in inter-bank capital flows across the euro zone created 
problem for the periphery states. It demonstrates how for the periphery states capital flight recreated 
through the bond markets a new version of the problem that the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) once 
caused for weak currency states and how in accessing credit and financial support through the euro zone 
authorities, including the ECB, the periphery states lost domestic autonomy. The final section draws some 
conclusions about the importance of structural external constraints in scholarly understanding of the 
predicaments generated by financialised economies. 
 
1. The internationalisation of bank assets 
From the late 1990s the international assets of banks increased hugely. By mid-2007 total foreign claims 
of domestically owned banks were rising at almost thirty per cent a year (McGuire and von Peter 2009, 9). 
As figure 1 shows, the rise of these claims for German, UK and French banks far dwarfed those for 
American banks and foreign claims were much higher in Germany than for other European banks until 
2004. Indeed the drive for international assets had begun first in Germany in 1998 when German banks 
started to seek higher returns abroad after several years of poor profitability from domestic lending 
(Hardie and Howarth 2009).  
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Source: Bank of International Settlements Statistics: International bank claims consolidated – immediate 
borrower basis 
 
 
These European banks increased their international assets in significant part through purchases in 
the US.  As figure 2 shows, the claims of European banks in the US rose sharply from 1999 to 2007, 
reaching nearly $5 trillion by the end of 2007.  
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Figure 1: Foreign claims of domestically owned banks in millions of US 
dollars 
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Source:  Calculated from Bank of International Settlements Statistics: International bank claims 
consolidated – immediate borrower basis.1 
 
 
The banks with largest claims, as figure 3 shows, were in order of size those in the UK, Switzerland, 
Germany, France, and the Netherlands.  
 
 
 
 
                                                             
1 The European countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. The totals for 1999 to 2002 does not 
include Greece, for 1999 to 2004 does not include Ireland, and for 2004 to 2007 does not include Finland 
as the data is not available. 
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Figure 2: Claims of domestically-owned banks in European countries 
in the US in trillions of US dollars 1999-2007     
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Source: Bank of International Settlements Statistics: International bank claims consolidated – immediate 
borrower basis 
 
 
The composition of these American assets varied by national banking sector. Those German and UK banks 
with large US assets made a high volume of investment purchases of bonds and securities, not least 
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs) whilst French banks purchased fewer such assets (Howarth 2012, 377-
378).  Nonetheless, large universal and commercial banks in the UK, Germany and France all had 
significant exposure to MBSs.  FRB data on its Agency MBS purchase programme initiated in 2008 shows 
the FRB bought such assets in 2009 and 2010 from Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland, BNP Paribas, and 
Deutsche Bank (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2013). 
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1999
Q4
2000
Q4
2001
Q4
2002
Q4
2003
Q4
2004
Q4
2005
Q4
2006
Q4
2007
Q4
M
il
li
o
n
s 
o
f 
U
S 
d
o
ll
ar
s 
Figure 3:  Largest claims in the US  of domestically owned-banks of European 
countries millions of  US dollars    
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Meanwhile a large volume of capital also flowed from banks in France, Germany, the UK, Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Switzerland to the euro zone periphery. As figure 4 shows, from 2002 – the year total 
gross capital flows started to accelerate – the claims of these banks in the euro zone periphery - in 
particular Italy, Spain and Ireland - rose sharply.  
 
 
 
Source: Bank of International Settlements Statistics: International bank claims consolidated – immediate 
borrower basis.2 
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Figure  4: Claims of domestically-owned banks of northern European 
economies in the euro zone periphery 1999 Q2 to 2007 Q2 in millions 
of US dollars 
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Making a comparison between French, German, UK and US banks, French and German banks were, as 
figure 5 shows, the most exposed with UK banks also more exposed than their US counterparts. By the 
onset of the Greek crisis in the third quarter of 2009, 55 per cent of the claims of European banks in the 
periphery belonged to German and French banks and the proportion collectively held by German, French 
and UK banks was 70 per cent (Calculated from BIS International Banking Statistics).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
2 The  northern European economies are Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the 
UK. The data for UK claims on Greece for Q2 2004 is missing.  
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Source: Bank of International Settlements Statistics: International bank claims consolidated – immediate 
borrower basis. 
 
Seen in this way for French, German and UK banks, the US asset-backed securities and the 
periphery bonds on the asset side of their balance sheets were symmetrical. In each case the foreign-issued 
bonds and securities they purchased were systemically mispriced. The MBSs bubble rested on the illusion 
that national house prices would never fall whilst the periphery bond boom made it appear that lending to 
the periphery was the same as lending to the German government and that spreads between bonds issued 
in the two countries would always be marginal. Whether, as Blyth (2013, 64) has argued, the banks buying 
periphery bonds were engaged in ‘the mother of all moral hazard trades’ or they spectacularly misjudged, 
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Figure 5: Claims of domestically-owned banks in France, Germany, the 
UK and US in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain in millions of 
US dollars 
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the outcome of their purchases for their balance sheets was the same: any reversal of market perception of 
the underlying risk would create a massive problem.   
The risk created by the nature of the asset purchases was compounded by the size of the assets these 
banks held. In comparative terms the volume of assets held by banks in a number of European countries 
were very significantly higher in relation to GDP than it was for US banks.  In 2007 the total assets of euro 
zone banks were equivalent to over 300 per cent of GDP and of UK banks over 500 per cent compared to 
less than 100 per cent in the US (Shambaugh 2012, 16; Bank of England 2010, 325). This problem was 
compounded by weak capital requirements.  When compared to American banks, French, German and UK 
banks all had poor capital to assets ratios. As figure 6 shows, banks in these three countries were in a 
worse position than American banks at the end of 2007, and their position deteriorated in 2008 whilst 
American banks improved their position.  
 
 
 
Source: IMF (2009), 15 and IMF (2010), 23. 
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 Of course aggregated national ratios can distort a more complicated picture.  German banks appear to 
have been in the worst position of banks in the four countries shown in Figure 6. In part this weakness is 
explained by the prevalence in Germany of a significant number of co-ops and savings banks with very 
little core Tier 1 capital. Nonetheless, taking the leverage ratios of the large universal French, German and 
UK banks, these banks increased their leverage during the pre-crisis years in a way in which their US 
counterparts did not (Noeth and Sengupta 2012, 464-5). Indeed, among universal banks almost certainly 
no other bank was as highly leveraged as Deutsche Bank (Coppola 2014).  
In sum, by 2007 German, UK and French banks had massively internationalised their assets 
without adequate capital to support the expansion. With high leverage ratios they held vast international 
assets many of which both in the US and the euro zone periphery were systematically mispriced in relation 
to risk.  In doing so they were extremely vulnerable to an abrupt change in market sentiment. 
 
2. Internationalised funding and the Federal Reserve Board  
In the context of internationalised market-based banking the structural counterpart of banks holding a 
high volume of US assets was a funding dependency on international dollar money markets.  This 
dependency constituted part of a more general shift from the turn of the century by universal and 
commercial banks away from funding lending almost entirely through customer deposits towards much 
greater use of wholesale markets, some of which were very short-term, and also among universal banks to 
greater use of these markets to fund larger investment asset portfolios. Borrowing in wholesale markets 
carried inherent risks for any bank or indeed other form of financial corporation (Huang and Ratnovski 
2011). Indeed these risks were at the centre of the financial crisis with the most common weakness of 
financial corporations in deepest crisis in 2007-8 being a disproportionate dependency on short-term 
funding in wholesale markets (van Rixtel and Gasperini 2013, 5; Beltratti and Stulz 2012; Raddatz 2010). 
For universal and commercial European banks this dependency came in good part from customer funding 
gaps of another magnitude to those in place among US banks (IMF 2014, 4; Le Leslé 2012, 6; Carmassi, 
Gros, and Micossi 2009, 98).  In direct comparative terms, as figure 7 shows, German, French and UK 
banks, were more dependent on short-term funding than their US counterparts.  Although there were 
significant national differences in the specific nature of this dependency, not least in the extent to which 
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this borrowing supported lending or asset purchases (Hardie and Howarth 2013b, 39-40), this 
dependency significantly increased these banks’ liquidity risk. 
 
 
 
Source: IMF (2008), 15. 
 
This general problem was then hugely compounded in consequence by dollar borrowing. To fund 
large-scale purchases and lending in dollars, these banks needed the capacity either to borrow dollars 
inter-bank or US money markets or use foreign exchange swap markets to convert liabilities in other 
currencies into dollars (McGuire and 2009, 50). The scale of this dollar dependency was higher in 
Germany and the UK than France (Howarth 2012, 382), but the simple fact of it qualitatively 
distinguished the collective position of banks in these three economies from the American financial 
corporations that were also reliant wholesale markets.  Any dysfunctionality in dollar inter-bank and 
money markets and foreign exchange swap markets risked leaving these European banks with disastrous 
problems, especially when there was a mismatch between their longer-dated US assets and their short-
term unsecured dollar borrowing (McGuire and von Peter 2009, 2; BIS Committee on the Global Financial 
System 2010, 2).   
 When wholesale markets first severely tightened in the summer of 2007 German and UK banks in 
particular faced significant dollar funding gaps, and this problem intensified a year later (McGuire and 
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Figure 7: Short-term funding ratios in national banking sectors at 
the end of 2007 as a percentage of total funding 
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Von Peter 2009, 54). Whatever these European states also did at national level, effective bailouts to 
prevent European banks collapsing were quite simply dependent on the US acting through the FRB as 
what McDowell (2012) has termed a ‘sovereign’ international lender of last resort. In its direct emergency 
lending programmes between December 2007 and 2010, the FRB effectively provided at least as much 
support to European banks as it did to American corporations.  As table 1 shows, when these programmes 
ended in July 2010, nine of the fifteen largest term-adjusted borrowers, leaving aside intermediary 
borrowing, were European banks including three belonging to the UK, and two to France and Germany.  
 
Table 1:  Largest-term adjusted borrowers from the Federal Reserve 
Board, December 2007 to July 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: United States Government Accountability Office (2011), 132. 
 
 
 Bank State 
1 Bank of America US 
2 Citgroup US 
3 Royal Bank of Scotland UK 
4 Barclays UK 
5 UBS  Switzerland 
6 Deutsche Bank  Germany 
7 Wells Fargo US 
8 Dexia Belgium 
9 Credit Suisse Switzerland 
10 Bank of Scotland UK 
11 Commerzbank Germany 
12 Goldman Sachs US 
13 Merrill Lynch US 
14 BNP Paribas France 
15 Société Générale France 
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The FRB also provided a direct supply of dollars through foreign exchange swap arrangements. In 
December 2007, the FRB announced a new line of swaps with the Bank of England, the ECB and the Swiss 
National Bank to close the dollar gap.  In September 2008, after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy, the FRB 
doubled the size of the swaps available. One month later, it announced that its swap arrangements with 
these three central banks would be increased to accommodate in its words ‘whatever quantity of US dollar 
funding is required’ (Quoted in Baba, McCauley, and Ramaswamy 2009, 76).   
This swap facility was reactivated by the FRB in May 2010 and ran through to August 2012 
(McGuire and von Peter 2012, 59). During this period the Bank of England drew no dollars (Federal 
Reserve Board of New York 2015), in part a consequence of UK banks reducing their general reliance on 
wholesale funding after 2008, with the customer funding gap falling by more than seventy per cent 
between 2008 and 2012 (Bank of England 2012, 19-20). By contrast, at the moments of most acute crisis 
within the euro zone from 2010 to the summer of 2012, the ECB made significant use of the facility. 
Strikingly, each crisis in the periphery in this period had a parallel crisis in the core produced by the 
problems generated by the need of various banks in those economies for dollar funding in the wake of the 
absence of funds from American money markets.  During this period the more problematic the periphery 
assets held by French and German banks appeared the less able French and German banks were to borrow 
in American money markets.  Since the bulk of the collective periphery assets of the French and German 
banks lay in Italy and Spain - with around 60 per cent of German exposure to the periphery being in these 
two countries and around 80 per cent of French exposure (Calculated from BIS International Banking 
Statistics) - these banks risked an immediate dollar funding crisis at any point when the pressures in 
Italian and Spanish bonds markets were particularly acute.  
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Taking the weekly data series published since May 2010 by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
(2014) on Foreign Exchange Swap Agreements, figure 8 shows that the volume lent by the Federal Reserve 
Board to the ECB rose and fell in relation to the development of the euro zone crisis from mid 2010 to 
2012. In the second week of May 2010, as the first Greek bailout was finalised and the ECB’s Securities 
Market Programme (SMP) agreed, the outstanding swap to the ECB stood at $9.2 billion. Although there 
was some small-scale borrowing around the time of the Irish bailout in November 2010, by the second 
week of March 2011, the ECB had largely cleared the swap. In the autumn of 2011, the ECB then began 
drawing dollars again as acute pressure mounted in the Spanish and, particularly, Italian sovereign bond 
markets despite the ECB’s large-scale purchases of Italian government bonds under the SMP. The volume 
of the outstanding swap reached another peak around the peak when the ECB unfolded a new Long Term 
Refinancing Operation (LTRO) through which periphery banks were able to bid for three-year euro 
funding.  Whilst the initial implementation of LTRO led to an immediate reduction in demand for dollars 
from the FRB, continuing uncertainty in the negotiations of the second Greek bailout produced a further 
peak.  Then after some months of relative calm, the renewal of bond market pressure on Spain produced a 
smaller surge in demand for dollars that was then diminished after the ECB’s announcement of intent on 
OMT to back Mario Draghi’s declaration in late July 2012 that the ECB was ‘ready to do whatever it takes’ 
to save the single currency (Quoted in Financial Times, 26 July 2013). 
Whilst the ECB does not publish data on the recipients of swap funding, by definition the banks 
taking dollars must have been those with the greatest dollar requirements, which in practice meant those 
most dependent on American money market funds.  Looking at the same period of the euro zone from this 
end, these money funds clearly reduced their exposure to European banks as the euro zone crisis took off 
in 2010. Moreover, in the second half of 2011, when the size of the swaps rose very sharply, these money 
funds withdrew money from European banks (Fender and McGuire 2010, 13-14; Fitch Ratings 2011; IMF 
2012, 26-29).  Between May and October 2011 US money fund dollar exposure fell to France by 69 per 
cent, to Germany by 50 per cent, to the UK by 25 per cent whilst it increased to US Treasury and Agencies 
by 55 per cent and to Japan by 38 per cent (Fitch Ratings 2011). Although these money funds did not 
return after the summer of 2012 to providing as much finance as they had prior to 2010, they did re- open 
to European banks, once the ECB had acted to convince these investors that the risk in exposure to 
European banks was manageable (Financial Times, 22 September 2013).  
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In sum, French and German banks confronted external funding crises, akin to those they had 
experienced with UK banks in 2007 and 2008, at intervals that corresponded strongly with the junctures 
when the euro zone crisis was at its most intense. Whilst these junctures were portrayed, not least in 
Germany, as crises for the periphery they were no less potential crises for France and Germany. As the 
IMF (2012, 77) later noted, in the autumn of 2011  ‘a full-blown bank crisis was in the making’. The 
consequences of such a crisis, in the IMF’s judgement, would have ‘exceeded those experienced in the 
aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy in 2008, threatening to bring capital markets and the international 
banking system to a halt and raising the spectre of a global economic downturn’. The actions that 
prevented such an escalation were structurally the same. In both cases the host states of the exposed banks 
acted to provide financial support in the local currency, whether by recapitalisation in the case of the 
financial crisis or through loans to the periphery and the ECB’s purchasing and lending programmes in the 
case of the euro zone crisis, and the FRB met the crucial requirement for dollars that American money 
markets refused to meet.  
 
 
4.    The euro zone periphery, the bond markets, and the ECB  
If in the wake of the internationalisation of banking during the pre-crisis years various German, French 
and UK banks had made themselves externally dependent on dollar funding, the periphery economies in 
the euro zone became reliant on cheap external credit from these same banks. The ability of periphery 
economic and political actors to access this capital stood in sharp contrast to the external financial 
conditions they had faced before the introduction of the euro.  Under conditions of open short-term capital 
flows, periphery economies with currencies perceived as inflationary and with weak current accounts had 
since the 1970s operated under an acute external monetary constraint.  Membership of the ERM created 
an institutionalised and permanent disjuncture between the lower interest rates available to Germany and 
those endured in the periphery.  Under the ERM, the only way for member-states to push interest rates to 
a level closer to those prevailing in Germany was to make their macro-economic policy stances as much 
like Germany’s as possible. For the periphery states this task had proved impossible and a succession of 
devaluations ensued that reinforced the interest rate differential. To compound the problem, from the late 
1970s to the middle of the 1990s the US and Germany generally ran monetary policies that produced 
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historically high long-term nominal interest rates. The cumulative consequences of this external monetary 
constraint on the periphery can be seen clearly in the predicament of Italy in 1991, the year the Maastricht 
Treaty was agreed: with state debt already standing at 92.5 per cent of GDP, Italy’s average long-term 
interest rate yield was 12.5 per cent, which was four per cent higher than the rate for Germany (Swanson 
2008). 
In its fundamental design the creation of the euro abolished this particular external constraint for 
the periphery by abolishing national monetary policy. If there was only one monetary policy set by the 
ECB, then all members of the euro zone could benefit from the same level of interest rates. In practice, the 
initial consequence of monetary union was indeed the convergence of long-term nominal interest rates 
between Germany and other euro zone members. Even Greece, as the last periphery member to join the 
euro, enjoyed a reduction on interest-rate spreads with Germany on ten-year government bonds from 
around 1100 basis points in 1998 to a range between 10 and 30 between 2002 and the end of 2007 
(Gibson, Hall, and Tavlas 2012). To accentuate the benefit for the periphery, this convergence took place 
against a backdrop of very low interest rates in the US sustained by the new flow of capital from East Asia 
across the Pacific, which allowed the ECB to set its interest rates during the pre-crisis years at lower levels 
than the Bundesbank had done in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Well before the euro zone crisis began, the fall out of the financial crisis began to reverse this benign 
external monetary environment for the periphery. From the Bear Stearns crisis in March 2008, market 
perceptions of budget deficits and state debt relative to Germany produced higher long-term sovereign 
bond yields (Attinasi, Checherita, and Nickel 2009, 5). For Greece the spread rose from around 30 basis 
points in early 2008 to around 300 in March 2009 (Attinasi, Checherita, and Nickel 2009, 5; Gibson, Hall, 
and Tavlas 2011, 10). Capital that had flowed from the core of the euro zone to the periphery now moved 
back (Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012). By May 2010, when the euro zone states agreed their first collective 
response to the crisis, these flows were through bond markets already generating the same structural 
problem for many members, including some outside the periphery, that the ERM had via the foreign 
exchange markets. In a clear echo of the ERM years, the French Prime Minister, François Fillon, said in 
June 2010: ‘The first thing I look at every morning is the spread differential between France and Germany’ 
(Quoted in Proissl 2010, 10).  For the periphery of the euro zone permanent fear of a capital flows crisis 
had returned, this time one that shut sovereigns and banks out of bond markets. In the cases of Greece, 
 21 
Ireland, and Portugal such a funding crisis arrived, requiring each of the three states to turn to the euro 
zone authorities and the IMF for loans that came, not least because of the position adopted by the German 
government, with strict fiscal conditionality and demands for structural and budgetary reform. In the 
cases of Spain and Italy, a full-scale crisis was avoided only by the ECB’s intervention through its SMP and 
LTRO. Support by the ECB through this route for Italy came with an explicit timetable from the ECB for 
the Italian government to pass new legislation, which led when Silvio Berlusconi refused to comply with its 
demand on pensions to his exit from office  (Thompson 2013, 11-12).   In this light, the consequence of a 
capital flows crisis for the periphery has been a new institutionalised external constraint created not only  
by new euro zone rules insisted upon by most powerful euro zone members (Donnelly, 2014). but the 
establishment of the ECB as a de facto yet conditional lender of last resort.  
Even since bond market pressures very significantly lessened for Spain and Italy in the last quarter 
of 2012, an external financial problem remains across the periphery. Under conditions of capital flight, the 
periphery economies were unable to cover their imports  (Jones 2013, 165).  Accordingly the real-time 
financial imbalances produced by capital flight from the periphery to Germany have been managed 
through Target2, the euro zone’s inter-bank payment system. Whilst the eventual consequences of Target2 
are much contested, not least in Germany, in practice it is a mechanism that allows periphery central 
banks to borrow from the Bundesbank to pay for imports. Put differently, it has become an official 
mechanism for dealing with the absence of privately generated capital flows. 
In sum, the fallout of the rapid increase in capital flows across the euro zone generated by French 
and German banks in particular eventually created an external funding crisis for the periphery economies 
with a clear parallel to the monetary dynamics that prevailed within the ERM under the fear of capital 
flight. The once structural incentive for periphery states to follow German monetary policy to try to 
maintain confidence in the foreign exchange markets became the imperative to achieve credibility in the 
bond markets through fiscal adjustment. This external structural weakness and the accompanying loss of 
policy autonomy generated by international markets was then intensified by the economic and political 
requirements of procuring emergency financial support through direct loans from the euro zone 
authorities and the IMF and the ECB’s new programmes.  
 
4. Conclusions 
 22 
The experiences of German, UK and French banks during the financial and euro zone crisis cast 
considerable empirical doubt on political economy arguments premised on the importance of variation 
between an Anglo-American model to finance and the comparative strength of a very different German 
approach. Large commercial and universal German, French and UK banks were in the international 
structure of both sides of their balance sheets vulnerable to a particular kind of crisis that comparable 
American banks were not. Risky international assets allied to a funding dependency on wholesale markets 
and dollar money markets in particular created huge external risks that transcended the conventional 
comparative political economy categorisations of advanced economies.  Whilst for UK banks the problem 
existed primarily between 2007 and 2009, for the exposed French and German banks the difficulty 
continued into the euro zone crisis especially in late 2011 and early 2012. During the pre-crisis years these 
banks purchased large volumes of systemically mispriced international assets in both the US and the 
periphery that left them extremely vulnerable to a lethal dollar-funding crisis when confidence in their 
balance sheets deteriorated. In this context, there is no necessary reason why for these banks the two 
crises had to develop in the sequence they did.  A collapse of confidence in the periphery bond market 
sentiment could have occurred before the crash of the MBSs market and in doing so acted as the first 
trigger of a dollar wholesale market crisis. In this sense the euro zone crisis was as much a crisis for French 
and German banks as the periphery. For the periphery itself the consequences of cross-border banks flows  
eventually created a new and sharper version of the pre-monetary union structural constraints at work in 
the ERM. The crisis of the periphery since late 2009 at has been at its centre a crisis of capital flight, which 
in its fallout has produced acute, immediate constraints on domestic economic and political autonomy 
through the conditional terms of access to emergency credit. 
We can understand the nature of these two sets of capital flows problems and the power dynamics 
then created by the need for emergency credit through the lens of the succession of banking and debt 
crises that have occurred around the world since financial liberalisation. At four sequential junctures in 
the summer of 2007, the autumn of 2008, late 2011 and early 2012, and the summer of 2012 various 
European banks faced a dollar-funding crisis precipitated by a balance sheet requirement for ongoing 
short-term flows of the American currency. In the same way that several Latin American states in the 
1980s and 1990s and east Asian corporations in the late 1990s suddenly found they had insufficient 
dollars roll over debt, these European banks confronted scarce access to dollar funding. What started off 
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as bank funding crises then became a foreign exchange crisis for their host states given the political 
impossibility of governments letting the banks fall or the practical one of providing dollars directly. Again 
there is a clear parallel with the earlier financial crises in Latin America and East Asia. The differences 
were of manifestation and remedy, not the underlying problem of dollar scarcity.  At the point of crisis 
there had to be a dollar lender of last resort and this time it was the American central bank rather than the 
IMF that fulfilled the role in a much less demanding manner for the recipient states.  Easy access to that 
lender required these states to enjoy the political support of the US government, as a succession of 
emerging-market economy states discovered in reverse when the FRB refused their requests for dollar 
swaps in October 2008 (Steil 2014, 56). For the periphery economies, their need for official credit looked 
more overtly like the kind of debt crises previously endured by developing-country states albeit without an 
exchange rate crisis. In securing financial support they had to subordinate themselves to the demands of 
both the governments of the core states led by Germany and the ECB. This loss of autonomy occurred even 
whilst the ECB was also acting through its swap arrangements with the FRB to provide financial support to 
German and French banks without policy conditionality and indirectly through its SMP and LTRO to 
lessen the market funding pressure.  
To conclude, since the beginning of financial liberalisation short-term international capital flows 
have generated sharp external constraints on domestic economic and political actors through the risk of 
capital flight.  In parallel to these international market constraints, the distribution of international 
monetary power privileged the United States in relation to all other states, and Germany in relation to the 
rest of Europe even within the context of the euro. The fallout of the financial crisis and the euro zone 
crisis have intensified these long-standing problems and created new roles for the FRB and the ECB with 
important consequences for the distribution of power between states within the international economy 
and the policy-making autonomy of the periphery members of the euro zone. Understanding the ongoing 
problems created by the destabilising nature of international capital flows over any substantial period of 
time and the power dynamics around access to emergency credit should be central to the ongoing political 
economy interrogation of the political future of financialised economies. 
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